there is ambiguity. In other words they attribute all departures from independence to ambiguity. This has a number of implications. Firstly they rule out other deviations from SEU such as the Allais paradox or state-dependent utility. Secondly they assume that satisfaction of the independence axiom implies the absence of ambiguity. This would be less controversial if we also assumed that the decision-maker is always averse to ambiguity. However, for a decision-maker who displays both ambiguity-aversion and ambiguity-preference this second implication is not clear. Even in the presence of ambiguity, independence may be satisfied if ambiguity-aversion and ambiguitypreference have equal and opposite effects on choice.
GMM show the class of preferences that they axiomatise and refer to as "invariant biseparable" may be associated with a set D of probability distributions, which they interpret as the decision maker's perceived ambiguity, and a function β ( f ) which they interpret as ambiguity-attitude. These preferences may be represented in the form
where E p denotes (conventional) expectation with respect to the additive probability distribution p and β is a function from the set of all acts to the unit interval. 1 It is important to note that the function β ( f ) depends on the act, f, being evaluated. In this note we focus on the implications of GMM's results for Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU) preferences. This is the subclass of invariant biseparable preferences that can be represented by a Choquet integral with respect to a capacity. GMM show that for CEU preferences D is the convex hull of the decision-weights used in the Choquet integral. Since the Choquet integral of an act is the expected value of the act with respect to one of the decision-weights, its value lies between the maximum and minimum expected values of that act with respect to the decision-weights. Hence, such a number β ( f ) can always be defined. How useful this representation is depends on the nature of the function β ( f ). We show that β is highly variable if the dimension of D is greater than two.
Although we present a few general results, the main purpose of this note is to illustrate the implications of GMM's results by studying how they apply to some common examples of CEU preferences. The first example is Hurwicz preferences, see Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) and Hurwicz (1951a,b) , the second is the case where the set D consists of all convex combinations of two probability distributions.
Organisation of the paper In the next section we describe the main framework and present some general results about GMM's representation. In Sect. 3 we introduce Hurwicz preferences and discuss how GMM's analysis applies to them. A second example where the set of priors is one dimensional is presented in Sect. 4 and 5 concludes.
